This article is based on an unpublished documents filed in the Historical Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile for the period [1974][1975][1976][1977][1978][1979][1980][1981][1982][1983][1984][1985][1986][1987][1988][1989]. This analysis has enabled file review and refute an important part of the current debate. This research allows us to affirm that the military regime not only practiced a foreign policy "Praetorian ideological" as he claimed the debate so far, but a pragmatic policy. This policy will not only survive allowed in its period, but survived beyond its end.
INTRODUCTION
Words to the heat of deeds too cold breath gives (Macbeth, Act II, Scene One).
When I began this research work in 1995, I had a series of convictions sustaining my initial research, which I kept until the year 2000.
At that time I found some unpublished documents filed at the Historical Archive of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Chile for the period of 1974-1989. In general terms, my convictions were at two levels, one at the analysis categories with which the Chilean military government policies had been processed, and the other regarding the issues part of such agenda.
The analysis categories were basically three. First, that the Government and the countr y had been left in a position of "international isolation".
1 Second, the militar y had been unable to act flexibly in the complex international politics, mainly due to their "praetorian-ideological diplomatic style". Third, the only way to overcome the international isolation had been linked to the economic "pragmatic relations structure" basically with East and South Asian countries, to which the local political situation was completely indifferent. 2 Consequently, and notwithstanding the achievements with East and South Asia, and obviously with Japan, the Military Government's foreign policy was qualified as a complete failure.
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On the other hand, the issues of the agenda, according to this initial perception, should have been focused on matters related to economic relations, mainly trade and to a lesser extent Japanese investments in Chile.
Now then, the review of this archive has allowed me to go over all these points again and thus conclude that much of this appraisal is to be subject to new interpretations.
ANALYSIS CATEGORIES
International Isolation
The international isolation of the Military Regime is a quite ambiguous idea which, however, has reached consensus within the academic community and in the public discourse regarding the results of the international policy of the foresaid government.
A solid explanation of the origin of this international isolation is found in a work by Francisco Rojas. This author clearly identifies three elements that explain such isolation: "a) the establishment of an authoritarian project which broke the link between foreign policy and democracy, as well as with human rights as the central axis; b) a diplomacy style characterized as "praetorian-ideological" contrasting with the civil-pragmatic model characteristic of the professional Chilean diplomacy; c) the prosecution and a distinct anticommunist foreign policy at a moment the international system was going into distension". 4 As it may be concluded from ano 2 • n. 
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They will not support attacks against us, nor will they take a risk on our favor.
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This perception started to change gradually. Contacts began to get closer to the extent that a Note was sent the following year. This note was about the 31st General Meeting of the United Nations. The Chilean government commented to the Japanese government that there was a new "show" against Chile, especially regarding the matter of human rights.
Chile requested from Japan "as much as possible", the following, This request reveals well developed diplomatic complicity, and although Japan was very cautious about these messages, even requesting from the Chilean Government further information on the prisoners in Chile, continued with its policy of trading "silence" and "abstentions" for votes to place its representatives at multilateral organisms.
Despite this caution, Japan showed a subtle agreement on political issues. In 1981, for example, it requested Chile's support for the election of a Japanese candidate to the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations. 14 There was no explicit commitment, but a clear message by asking support from a government highly disputed in this matter.
12 "Secret Internal Memorandum n° 5," HAFAMCh, March 14, 1975. Contrary to what Ambassador Besa Lyon thought, and quoting his own words, Japan did "take a risk" for the Chilean Military Government.
As can be seen (Table # 1) , this cross support got consistent from the beginning, and became significant.
Only rarely was the support requested refused by the counterpart. However, already by the eighties the Chilean Government started to condition its support to Japan to immediate retributions. These resulted in Japanese support to elect Chilean candidates at less important international organisms, and to get the loans mentioned above. As an almost natural consequence of these coincidences, the bilateral trade became increasingly sustained (Table # 2 
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Additionally, Japan also gradually increased the volume of its cooperation to Chile in the eighties. 19 Although this cooperation was focused on supplementing direct investments in the mining, fishing, and forestry sectors, it was also aimed at sectors that only had social profits.
THE TOPICS OF THE AGENDA
During the period 1974-1989, the bilateral Agenda was around a few topics (Table # 3 and 8), almost 50% of which was in matters of international politics, and to a lesser extent in matters regarding economic relations, which only accounted for about 19% of the Agenda.
The paradox that the relations we thought of as basically economic had a quite high political component is due to the fact that the strategy to offset the international political isolation of the Chilean Military Government not only was the result of the economic pragmatism of the non-state players, but the result of the political pragmatism of governments which, in this case, we could hardly designate as "praetorian-ideological". Consequently, this strategy shows that the governments, and not the companies, controlled the process. The companies, in turn, backed up and supported the actions taken by the relevant states.
Notwithstanding the above, it is possible to see some wor th reviewing nuances regarding the following analysis variables de analysis:
local politics, international politics, economy and cooperation. From the point of view of the general trend, the number of contacts declined, which is inversely proportional to the expansion of business and the institutionalization of the Chile-Japan Business Cooperation Committee. 20 The said Committee started to operate in 1979 between private entrepreneurs of both countries, thus replacing the classical the classical relation between Chilean state-run companies and private Japanese companies. The conclusion regarding this apparent dichotomy is mostly explained because as the model was consolidating, the political-diplomatic demand for contacts was decreasing. The result of this was the expansion of the bilateral trade as shown in the tables in the addenda below.
Local Politics
This variable is divided into two sub-variables. One concerns Chile and/or Japan politics, and the other, Japan's policies towards other countries.
In general, the documents reveal that the interests in local politics decreased relative to the perception the military Government had of its own security and survival in power.
Thus, already by the mid eighties there is almost no information on this matter. However, at the beginning of this period there is more information available on the impact of the Coup on Japan, as well as on the identification and neutralization of actions against the Military Government. The first concern was focused on assessing the internal public opinion, both of the state and non-state players, as well as less influent groups. The second was addressed to analyzing the actions of former Government members and those of Salvador Allende's family, in order to assess them and neutralize their impact on the local public opinion. 20 Ross, César. "Comité Empresarial Chile-Japón," El Mercurio, October 11, 1999; César Ross, "El Comité Empresarial Chile-Japón: De la liturgia al libre comercio, 1979 comercio, -1999 comercio, ," Diplomacia, n. 86, p. 89-111, 2001 ; César Ross, Chile y Japón, 1973-1989: de la incertidumbre a la alianza estraté-gica. Santiago: LOM/USACH, 2007; Ross César. "La política chilena hacia Japón, 1990-2010: La relevancia del largo plazo". In: Artaza, Mario; Ross, César (Eds). La Política Exterior de Chile, 1990 Chile, -2009 : Del aislamiento a la integración global. Santiago: RIL Editores; USACH, 2012.
REVISTA DIREITOS HUMANOS E DEMOCRACIA
International Politics
This variable is made up of five sub-variables: international visits and moments, bilateral support at multilateral organisms, Japanese policy towards Chile, Chilean policy towards Japan, and agreements and treaties.
As stated above, this is the broadest variable both because of the number of sub-variables and the volume of information found (47.9 %).
Here we can see that the main concern of the Military Government was to overcome its isolation by way of the said "transactional" strategy.
We can see that the "bilateral support at multilateral organisms" and the definition of a "Chilean policy towards Japan" were the most important objectives, accounting for about 56% of the variable. Second to these were "international visits and meetings" and "Japanese policy towards Chile", both accounting for 38% of the variable. Third with 6.2% was the topic of the agreements and treaties which, due to their own nature of the matter, had to have a lower frequency.
Up to this point, it is possible to conclude that this part of the Japanese policy of the Military Government was a true "combination of achievement and luck", in which results were gradually increasing in favor of the Chilean Government.
Economy
The economic topics of the Agenda focused on three areas: trade, Japanese investments in Chile, and Japanese loans to the State of Chile.
The structure of this variable was clearly biased to trade, which accounted for about 41% of the topics.
Second, Japanese investments and loan flows to Chile accounted as a whole for 53.7% of the Agenda concerns.
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Third, and as an issue concerning more during the first years of the Military Government, was the sub-variable regarding the "relations of Japan with other economies" (5.3%). Basically, because as the results Chile was getting were improving, the tension due to the economic links of Japan with other countries was decreasing. During this early stage, a geopolitical concept of the economic relation may have prevailed.
Cooperation
This variable is divided into three sub-variables, "cooperation from Japan to Chile", "cooperation from Chile to Japan", and "donations from Japan to Chile".
In percentages, 70% of the variable issue was focused cooperation from Japan to Chile". This variable was almost exclusively related to the Japanese interests in the field of its direct investments, namely, mining, and the fishing and forestry sectors.
The "cooperation from Chile to Japan", and "donations", usually from Japan to Chile, accounted for 16% and 14%, respectively. Consequently, cooperation, more than a sign of friendship and good will (which actually happened), was a clear sign of the Japanese pragmatism in all the scope of this relation.
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developed on a non-subjecting basis, and in a more supplementary way than Chile did with the United States, or with other hegemonic power centers with which the country had previous dominating relations. 
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ADDENDA
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Local politics: events happening in Japan and in its regional influence area. as well as their impact on bilateral relations. 
